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Election of Remedies in Kentucky Employment
Discrimination Cases - Dead or Alive?
By Rainbow Forbes*
"[W]e hold that KRS Chapter 344 [Kentucky Civil Rights Act]
authorizes alternative avenues of relief one administrative and one
judicial... Once any avenue of relief is chosen, the complainant must
follow that avenue through to its final conclusion. "
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of election of remedies "requires an individual to
elect a single forum in which to pursue a grievance, and prohibits the
election of a second forum in which to pursue the same grievance."
2
Reasons in support of such a doctrine include preventing forum
shopping and double recovery along with requiring a defendant to
answer to the same charges only once.3 Election of remedies is most
prevalent in civil rights cases in respect to employment
discrimination.
Kentucky codified such a doctrine in its Civil Rights Act,4 which
states in part that a claimant cannot pursue a judicial remedy while an
administrative claim is pending.5 The statute further states that a
final determination by a court or the commission will preclude the
* J.D., 2004, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.
B.A., 2000 University of Kentucky. Ms. Forbes is currently an attorney-advisor to
Judge Daniel Roketenetz with the Office of Administrative Law Judges,
Department of Labor. She wishes to thank Professors David Short and Rick Bales
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1. Vaezkornoi v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Ky. 1995).
2. Meira Schulman Ferziger, J.D., Annotation, Pursuit of NonJudicial Remedy
for Employment Discrimination as Amounting to Election Against Judicial
Remedy, 103 A.L.R. 5TH 557 (2002).
3. Id.
4. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344 (Banks-Baldwin 2004).
5. See id. at § 344.270.
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alternative avenue of relief.
6
Debate on this statute entered the judicial realm in the Kentucky
Supreme Court decision of Vaezkoroni v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.7 In
Vaezkoroni, Kentucky's highest court held that once an avenue of
relief is chosen, administrative or judicial, then that avenue must be
pursued to its finality.8 The claimant's initial choice was the basis of
the election of remedy. 9 The court's opinion was brief and provided
little analysis of the issue. 10 Such language appeared to be in direct
conflict with the Kentucky Civil Rights statute that requires a final
order or decision to preclude further remedy.' 1 Due to lingering
questions, the case instigated further litigation. Without a clear
rationale, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, along with other courts,
interpreted Vaezkoroni inconsistently. 12  Nine years later, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has yet to clarify the issue.
Having apparently closed the door on election of remedies in
employment discrimination, Vaezkoroni surprisingly gave rise to a
line of cases trying to circumvent its holding.13 A recurring problem
arose when claimants filed for administrative remedies, withdrew
those complaints from the Kentucky Human Rights Commission, and
then filed for judicial remedies in state circuit courts. Courts
originally upheld the decision, 14 while factual distinctions were later
used to elude the Vaezkoroni opinion. 15 Ultimately, a sharply divided
Kentucky Court of Appeals sitting en banc held that the language at
issue in Vaezkoroni was dicta and no longer served as precedent. 16
Vaezkoroni's conflicting interpretations demonstrate the
remaining question: May a claimant initiate a claim with the
Commission, withdraw the claim before finality, and then pursue a
judicial remedy? If the answer is yes, then a new set of questions
6. Id.
7. 914 S.W.2d 341, 343.
8. See Vaezkornoi v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Ky. 1995).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See infra pages 6-7 (quoting the language of KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
344.270).
12. See infra Part IV (discussing Vaezkoroni's progeny).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Brown v. Diversified Decorative Plastics, LLC, 103 S.W.3d 108, 110
(Ky. Ct. App. 2003).
24-2
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should be presented to the Kentucky Supreme Court regarding the
scope and implementation of such a holding. This note addresses
these questions of Vaezkoroni and its progeny. Part II reviews the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act. Part III summarizes Vaezkoroni and
analyzes its effects. Part IV addresses Vaezkoroni's progeny and
discusses problems that have arisen. Part V evaluates the current law
and presents future problems that the courts have yet to address.
II. KENTUCKY CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
In 1966, the Kentucky legislature adopted the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act (KCRA). 17 The purpose behind KCRA was to prevent
discrimination based on race, sex, age, gender, etc. KCRA provided
new standards in the employment law context.
KCRA diverged from the federal election of remedies standard
established in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 The federal
statute required a claimant to exhaust the possible administrative
remedies by first seeking a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or a state human
rights commission. 19 In contrast, KRCA allows an individual the
choice of pursing an administrative remedy or filing suit in state
circuit court. 20 The statute reads in part:
A state court shall not take jurisdiction over any claim
of an unlawful practice under this chapter while a
claim of the same person seeking relief for the same
grievance is pending before the commission. A final
determination by a state court or a final order of the
commission of a claim alleging an unlawful practice
under KRS 344.450 shall exclude any other
administrative action or proceeding brought in
accordance with K.R.S. Chapter 13B by the same
person based on the same grievance.
21
Kentucky courts initially construed this statute to allow a
17. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. Ch. 344 (Banks-Baldwin 1966).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2004).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2004).
20. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.270.
21. Id.
246 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-2
claimant to file an administrative charge, withdraw that claim, and
file for a judicial remedy in state court. Vaezkoroni created a new
interpretation of the statute.
III. VAEZKORONI V. DOMINO'S PIZZA, INC.: 22 ELECTION OF REMEDIES
IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Vaezkoroni v.
Domino's Pizza, Inc. 23 stands as the foundational case for election of
remedies under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act24 in regards to
employment discrimination. In this 1995 case, Ahmad Vaezkoroni,
whose country of origin is Iran, filed three charges of discrimination
against his former employer with the Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Human Rights Commission (Fayette County Commission).
The Fayette County Commission dismissed all three claims with a
finding of "no probable cause. ' '26 Over a year and half later, the
appellant filed a complaint in Fayette Circuit Court alleging similar
27contentions. Domino's Pizza, Inc. moved for summary judgment
because Section 344.270 precluded a judicial remedy in circuit
court. 28 Also, the respondent asserted res judicata as a ground for
barring the complaint.9 The Fayette County Circuit Court dismissed
the action. Vaezkoroni appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the trial court's decision on res judicata.3'
Vaezkoroni then appealed the case to the Kentucky Supreme Court.32
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals
22. 914 S.W.2d 341, 343.
23. Id.
24. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.
25. See Vaezkornoi, 914 S.W.2d 341.
26. See id. at 341.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 342.
29. Id.
30. See Vaezkornoi, 914 S.W.2d at 343. Judge Lewis Paisley, sitting as the
Fayette County Circuit Court judge, granted summary judgment in this case
precluding the claimant's recovery. Id. Later as a Kentucky Court of Appealsjudge, he sided with the majority in Brown v. Diversified Decorative Plastics, LLC,
103 S.W.3d 108, 109 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003) allowing the claimant's recovery.
31. See Vaezkoroni, 914 S.W.2d at 342.
32. Id.
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decision under a different rationale. 33 The court first addressed the
issue of whether Chapter 344 applies to local human rights
commissions as it does to the Kentucky Human Rights
Commission. 34  The court quickly answered that the statute's
provisions apply to both types of commissions and to hold otherwise
would undermine the very purpose of the statute. 35 The court noted
that the Act provided "alternative sources of relief, one
administrative and one judicial."36 If the court made a distinction
between the two commissions, then an individual would be able to
possibly pursue both sources of relief.3 7 The court discussed how the
two commissions are compatible and how local ordinances, as well
as other state statutes, supported this contention.38 After dismissing
the appellant's wrongful reliance on a previous case, the court
finished with strong language:
In conclusion, we hold that KRS Chapter 344
[Kentucky Civil Rights Act] authorizes alternative
avenues of relief, one administrative and one judicial.
The administrative avenue also includes alternatives;
the individual may bring a compliant [sic] of
discrimination before either the [Kentucky]
Commission or the local commission. Once any
avenue of relief is chosen, the complainant must
follow that avenue through to its final conclusion.
This interpretation is necessary 'to give meaning to
and carry out the obvious purposes of the act as a
whole.' 7
Vaezkoroni established that in employment discrimination cases
brought under Chapter 344, there are two methods of relief -
administrative and judicial - which operate in an either/or manner.
40
33. Id. at 342-43.
34. Id. at 342.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., 840 S.W.2d. 814, 820 (Ky.
1992)).
37. See Vaezkoroni, 914 S.W.2d at 342.
38. Id.at 342-43.
39. Id. at 343.
40. Id.
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This decision allows individuals with a state employment
discrimination claim to elect among the remedies and bring a
complaint under the Kentucky Human Relations Commission (or a
local commission) or file suit in state court alleging discrimination.4'
If the claimant exercises one method, then the other is no longer
available.42
In hindsight, the Vaezkoroni decision opened the floodgates for
employers to seek summary judgment in cases where the plaintiff
previously filed administrative charges. The reach of the language in
the court's decision is questionable. For example, is the language the
holding or mere dicta? Is the real issue the court's analysis of the
commissions? Can this case be factually distinguished to allow
withdrawal of a claim from one avenue and pursuit in another?
Understandably, a distinct line of cases followed this decision with
the Kentucky Court of Appeals wavering in each new opinion. An
analysis of Vaezkoroni's progeny leads to the following suggestions:
1) the decision has been implicitly overturned, 2) a current Kentucky
Supreme Court opinion is desperately needed, or 3) new questions
regarding election of remedies in employment discrimination have
emerged.
IV. VAEZKORONI'S PROGENY
As relevant to employment discrimination, six cases form
Vaezkoroni's progeny. These cases address the question of whether
Vaezkoroni may be applied to bar situations where an administrative
remedy has been attempted but not exhausted, and then the individual
pursues a judicial remedy. Viewed separately, the cases challenge
and demonstrate a step away from the standard for election of
remedies applied post- Vaezkoroni.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Monmouth St. Mercs' Bus. Assoc. v. Ryan, 56 S.W.2d 963, 964
(Ky. 1933)).
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A. Enforcement of Vaezkoroni
1. Young v. Sabbatine
43
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion,
Young v. Sabbatine, first interpreted the Vaezkoroni decision.
44
James Young, Sr. was fired from his job at a detention center after
complaints and disciplinary actions but before the opportunity to
resign.45 Pursuant to that action, the appellant alleged racial
discrimination and filed two charges - one with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and one with the
Fayette County Commission.46  The Commission made a
determination of "no probable cause" so the appellant moved for a
rehearing. 47  Before the rehearing could occur, the appellant
withdrew his claim from the Commission and asked the EEOC for a
48
right to sue letter. Approximately two months later, the appellant
filed suit in federal district court.
49
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
dismissal of state law discrimination claims because the appellant's
pursuit of an administrative remedy barred him from a subsequent
judicial remedy.50 The court's analysis on this issue was brief.5 1 The
court summarized the Vaezkoroni case and agreed that the appellant's
state law discrimination claim was barred because "[p]laintiff's
initial election of an administrative remedy precludes judicial
relief."52
Two problems arise out of this court's conclusion. First, the
Young case is factually distinguishable from the Vaezkoroni case. In
Vaezkoroni, the appellant pursued his administrative claims to
finality, receiving three separate denials from the Commission before
seeking a judicial remedy. 53 However, in the present case, appellant
43. No. 97-5169; 1998 WL 136559 (6th Cir. March 19, 1998).
44. Id.
45. See id. at *1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Young, 1998 WL 136559 at *1.
50. Id. at *4.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Vaezkornoi, 914 S.W.2d at 341-42 (emphasis added)).
53. See Vaezkornoi, 914 S.W.2d at 341.
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was in the process of appealing a decision from the Commissioner
when he withdrew his administrative claim.54 His claim was not final
under Section 344.270, and thus the statute still permitted him to
pursue a judicial remedy. Second, as an extension of the first
argument, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the doctrine of election of
remedies to apply to a claimant's initial choice of remedy. Injustifying this interpretation, the court relies directly on the language
from Vaezkoroni interpreting Chapter 344: "once any avenue of relief
is chosen, the complaint must follow that through to its final
conclusion." 55 This directly conflicts with the language in Section
344.270 that emphasizes the finality of the remedy as critical: "a final
determination by a state or a final order of the commission ... shall
exclude any other administrative action or proceeding., 56 The Sixth
Circuit ignored this distinction in the language of the statute and the
Vaezkoroni case.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit questionably extended Vaezkoroni to
claimants who may not have pursued their administrative remedy to
finality - barring future judicial remedy upon an initial election of
remedies.
2. Founder v. Cabinet for Human Resources57
The next application of Vaezkoroni was in Founder v. Cabinet for
Human Resources,58 decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
This case presented a similar issue to Young - whether the doctrine of
election of remedies precludes the exercise of a judicial remedy when
the administrative claim has been initiated but not pursued to
finality.59 The court of appeals attempted to directly address the
question that the Sixth Circuit passed on in Young by interpreting the
Vaezkoroni opinion to preclude a claimant from filing for an
administrative remedy, withdrawing that claim, and then seeking a
judicial remedy. 60
In the case sub judice, Howard Founder worked for the Kentucky
54. See Young, 1998 WL 136559 at *1.
55. Id. at * 4 (citing Vaezkornoi, 914 S.W.2d 341, 343).
56. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 344.270.
57.23 S.W.3d 221 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).
58. Id.
59. See Founder, 23 S.W.3d at 221-24.
60. Id. at 223-24.
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Department of Employment Services (DES) and filed an internal
grievance claiming that DES guidelines classified him as an Auditor
Chief.6 1 When the appellant received an unfavorable response, he
appealed to the Kentucky Personnel Board (Board) pursuant to law.62
The Board, adopting the hearing officer's recommendation, found
against the appellant and dismissed his claim. 63 Appellant then re-
filed the appeal alleging race discrimination in the reclassification
process.64 The Board reached the same conclusion denying the
claim. 65 The appellant sought four more appeals, all of which were
unsuccessful. 66  During this time, the appellant filed similar
complaints with the EEOC and the Kentucky Commission on Human
67Rights (Commission). Appellant received a right to sue letter from
the EEOC and a withdrawal order from the Commission on
December 8, 1994.68 Appellant was reclassified to the requested
position in September 1994, and he subsequently filed an action in
state circuit court alleging racial discrimination and retaliation on
October 26, 1994.69
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in a three-judge panel, began the
court's analysis by summarizing Vaezkoroni and quoting the
holding.70 The court moved to statute interpretation and set forth the
pertinent language of Section 344.270: "[a] state court shall not take
jurisdiction over any claim of an unlawful practice under this chapter
while a claim of the same person seeking relief from the same
grievance is pending before the commission.
71
Then, the court attempted to address the appellant's argument that
his case should be distinguished from Vaezkoroni because he
withdrew his claim from the Commission before it was able to issue a
ruling.72 Although Vaezkoroni does not expressly address this
differing factual situation, the court ultimately decided to extend
61. Id. at 222.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Founder, 23 S.W.3d at 222.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 223.
71. See Founder, 23 S.W.3d at 223 (quoting KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.270).
72. Id.
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Vaezkoroni to preclude a judicial remedy in this factual situation
because the appellant previously filed an administrative complaint
that was not completed to its finality.73 From an interpretation of the
statute and the Vaezkoroni case, the court held that "once a complaint
is filed with the Commission, a subsequent action in circuit court
based on the same civil rights violation is barred. 74
The court continued the analysis trying to reconcile two previous
cases with the present opinion. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that the opinion in Canamore v. Tube Turns Division of
Chemetron Corp.76 was consistent with Founder even though it
allowed a claimant who had an order pending before the Commission
to file a complaint in state circuit court. This decision was in
accordance with Founder and, the following year, Clifton v. Midway
78College narrowed this holding. The appellant, in this instance, filed
a claim with the EEOC that deferred the complaint to the
Commission. 79 Then, the Commission returned jurisdiction to the
EEOC with no sworn complaint filed directly by the claimant with
the Commission. The appellant sought relief in circuit court. 81 In
Clifton, the court held that election of remedies did not apply because
the appellant filed no complaint with the Commission. Without
further explanation, the Founder court held that these two cases
supported its opinion and barred appellant Founder from election of
remedies. 83
Although this court makes a slightly better attempt at clarifying
the application of Vaezkoroni, the justification for applying election
of remedies to prevent a judicial remedy is ambiguous and unclear.
By quoting the language of Section 344.270, it appeared that the
court would not allow the appellant's judicial remedy because, at the
time it was filed, he still had not received an order of withdrawal
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 223-24.
76. 676 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
77. See Founder, 23 S.W.3d at 224 (citing Canamore, 676 S.W.2d 800).
78. 702 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1985).
79. See Founder, 23 S.W.3d at 224 (citing Clifton v. Midway College, 702
S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1985)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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from the Commission. 84 Thus, the appellant's administrative claim
was still pending. However, the court did not expand on this concept
to justify the decision as a pure violation of Section 344.270.
Instead, the Kentucky Court of Appeals made an unforeseen turn and
based the opinion on a similar rationale used in Young - focusing on
the initial choice in filing the complaint.85 In a misleading effort to
explain the reasoning, the court tried to cite two cases to support the
opinion. Unfortunately, a closer reading shows that these cases seem
to contradict the very essence of the Founder decision and can easily
be factually distinguished.
Without a clear justification for the court's reasoning, this
decision only further added to the confusion surrounding Vaezkoroni.
In addition, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review
on this case in August 2000.6
B. A Step Away From Vaezkoroni
1. Grego v. Meijer, Inc. 87 and Thomas v. Forest City Enterprises88
In March 2001, the first major move from Vaezkoroni was in
Grego v. Meijer, Inc.89 Ironically, it was a federal district court that
began to re-evaluate the language in a Kentucky statute to provide a
new analysis of Vaezkoroni.
The plaintiff, Stephanie Grego, alleged sexual harassment from
coworkers while on the job, and accordingly she filed a complaint
with the Commission. 9° Over a year and a half later, she requested
and was granted a withdrawal of her claim without prejudice. 91 In
the following months, she filed suit in state court asserting similar
claims.92 The case was removed to federal court on diversity of
84. Id.
85. See Founder, 23 S.W.3d at 223-24.
86. Id. at 221.
87. 187 F. Supp. 2d 689 (W.D. Ky. 2001). This decision was issued by
District Judge John G. Heyburn II. Id.
88. No. CIV.A. 3:O0CV-764-H, 2001 WL 1772018 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2001).
This decision was issued by District Judge John G. Heyburn II. Id.
89. 187 F. Supp. 2d 689 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
90. See id. at 689, 691.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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citizenship grounds.
93
The federal district court, in predicting how the Kentucky
Supreme Court would decide the case, first acknowledged that the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act provides for two separate avenues of
relief - administrative and judicial.94  The court employed a
straightforward interpretation of the language of Section 344.270.9"
This was the first time that any court after Vaezkoroni addressed the
plain meaning of the statute. The district court held that "if a
grievance 'is pending,' then courts have no jurisdiction over the
claim. However, where one withdraws his claim, it cannot be
'pending' and is thus not barred by the plain language of section
344.270." 96
The district court conceded that this interpretation was in direct
conflict with the Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision in Founder.97
In a glaring footnote, the court explained why the Founder opinion
was incorrectly decided, including reasons such as ignoring the plain
language of the statute, imposing an archaic interpretation of the
doctrine of election of remedies, and analyzing other states' more
well-reasoned approaches. 98 The court accepted that it could not
ignore the Founder decision; thus, it began to search for a way to
evade its effect.99 Federal courts sitting in diversity of jurisdiction
are bound by a state's highest court decisions, so a long interpretation
of previous Kentucky Supreme Court cases was undertaken. t00
Unsurprisingly, the district court began its endeavor with
Vaezkoroni and factually distinguished it from the case sub judice.l ot
Vaezkoroni decided "the situation where the administrative agency
has investigated a complaint and issued a final determination on its
merits."' 102 The district court interpreted this to bar a subsequent
remedy when one avenue was pursued to its final conclusion.10 3
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Grego, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. atn. 1.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 691.
101. See Grego, 187 F. Supp. 2d. at 692-93.
102. See id. at 693.
103. Id.
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The district court moved to other faults in Founder's reasoning.
Founder relied upon Clifton10 4 for support in the analysis.' 0 5 The
district court considered Founder's narrow reading of Clifton
misplaced and speculated that the Kentucky Supreme Court would
use the case's broad language as well as McNeal v. Armour and
Co., 106 which was cited in Clifton, to hold the "election of remedies
provision as only prohibiting simultaneous judicial and
administrative actions. '
' 07
The district court concluded by stating that the Kentucky Court of
Appeals did not follow "the road map" as set out in previous
Kentucky Supreme Court decisions and thus decided that the
Kentucky Supreme Court would not uphold Founder. °8 Therefore,
the district court allowed the plaintiff's suit because she did not have
an administrative complaint concurrently pending, and the agency's
review did not reach final determination by the Commission. 109
A few months later in October 2001, the same district court was
again presented with this issue in the unreported opinion of Thomas
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.110 Shirley Thomas, the plaintiff,
initiated an administrative remedy, withdrew that remedy, and then
sought a judicial remedy. I ' Predicting that the Kentucky Supreme
Court would not follow Founder, the district court used almost
identical language to that in Grego and instead interpreted the statute,
along with previous cases, to allow a judicial remedy as long as no
administrative complaint is pending.
The Grego decision is very informative. It is the first case to
focus on the language of the Kentucky Election Remedies Statute. 113
The opinion involved a plain language analysis of the statute, moving
the emphasis from the initial choice of an avenue of relief relied upon
104. Clifton v. Midway College, 702 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1985).
105. See Grego, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
106. 660 S.W.2d 987 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
107. See Grego, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
108. Id. at 693.
109. Id.
110. Thomas v. Forest City Enters., No. CIV.A.3:00CV-764-H, 2001 WL
1772018 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2001). This decision was issued by District Judge
John G. Heyburn II. Id.
I11. Id. at *1.
112. Id. at *4.
113. See supra text accompanying note 96 (quoting the language of KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 344.270).
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in previous cases, to the final determination, or order, as stated in the
statute.'14  Of lesser importance, the district court looked to past
Kentucky Supreme Court decisions for a comprehensive precedent to
contrast the factual differences in Grego."T The court discussed
Vaezkoroni, Clifton, and McNeal to justify the holding.11 6
However, Grego is most significant for being the first decision
that makes the distinction regarding whether administrative and
judicial remedies are both "pending."'117 This relates back to the
move from an emphasis on initial filing choices to final orders. The
timeline of a claimant's action becomes crucial in this type of
analysis, as does the timing of an administrative final order.
In recognizing the wrongful reliance on the Founder court's
reasoning, the district court provided a step-by-step approach for
future Kentucky courts to move away from the Founder and
Vaezkoroni rationales and allow a more flexible approach to the
doctrine of election of remedies."18 Most notably, Grego emphasized
the pendency of the claim in the two separate avenues of relief.
2. Wilson v. Lowe's Home Center
119
The Kentucky Court of Appeals wasted little time in adopting and
applying the Grego reasoning to the state case, Wilson v. Lowe's
Home Center, 12 in December 2001.
In Wilson, Robert Parker Wilson alleged racial harassment from
coworkers and management during the period from 1991 to 1999.121
The appellant claimed that he notified supervisory personnel, and no
action was taken to stop the harassment.122 Then, the appellant filed
a complaint with the Commission asserting similar charges. 123 Ahearing date was set, but, before the date arrived, the appellant
114. See Grego, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 692-93.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 692.
118. Id.
119. Wilson v. Lowe's Home Ctr., 75 S.W.3d 229 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
120. Id.
121. See id. at 230.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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withdrew his claim.1 24 He also received a right to sue letter from the
EEOC. 125 Subsequently, the appellant filed suit in state circuit court
alleging racial discrimination under K.R.S. Chapter 344.126 The trial
court awarded summary judgment to the defendant based upon
election of remedies and Vaezkoroni.127  The Kentucky Court of
Appeals was presented with a second chance to decide the election of
remedies issue.
The court began by stating that the Kentucky Civil Rights Act,
K.R.S. Chapter 344, sets forth two separate means of relief -
administrative and judicial. 128 The court then quoted K.R.S. Section
344.270 and said that the two avenues of relief were "alternative, not
identical." 129 Next, the court of appeals addressed Vaezkoroni, which
the trial court relied upon in granting summary judgment. 130
Founder was also summarized by the court.131 It appeared to the
court at first glance that these cases supported the trial court's
decision, however, under further examination, factual differences
distinguished them from the case sub judice. 32  Vaezkoroni was
easily differentiated because the appellant had pursued the
administrative avenue to final determination, and thus it would be
unfair to provide a second avenue of relief to a claimant who was
unsuccessful under a first attempt. 133  The court distinguished
Founder because there the appellant still had his administrative
proceeding pending when he filed for a judicial remedy in circuit
court. 134 This was a clear violation of K.R.S. Section 344.270.13
The court noted in the opinion that the contradicting language in both
Founder and Vaezkoroni was dicta and thus did not deserve equal
weight. 136 Ultimately, in Wilson, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that the appellant had not pursued his administrative claims to
124. Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 230-3 1.
125. Id. at 231.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 232; see also Vaezkornoi, 914 S.W.2d 341.
128. Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 232.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 233.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 236.
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finality, nor was there an administrative claim pending; therefore, the
appellant was not barred by election of remedies.' 3
7
The court then analyzed the doctrine of election of remedies.138
Some jurisdictions focus on the beginning of the suit.1 39  If an
administrative avenue is chosen, then a judicial remedy will not be
allowed unless certain exceptions are met. 140  Other jurisdictions
apply the doctrine of election of remedies only when the cause of
action is prosecuted to judgment. 141 Still another view looks to the
pendency of the action. 142  An administrative claim may be
commenced, but, if it is withdrawn before a judicial remedy is
sought, then the remedy will be allowed. 143  This view prevents
simultaneous pursuit of both avenues of relief. 1
44
The court continued by citing previous Kentucky Supreme Court
cases, Canamore and Clifton, discussed supra.145  The court went
through an extensive examination of Kentucky cases that involve the
doctrine of election of remedies but were outside of the employment
discrimination context. 
146
The court of appeals concluded that a claimant in Kentucky has
the right to withdraw an administrative complaint prior to final
determination on its merits and then pursue a judicial remedy in state
court. 14 7  However, the court recognized that this could create a
problem with late withdrawals of claims. 148 The court stated that a
"party may not file a claim, proceed to trial or hearing, and then
withdraw the claim before the ruling body issues a final
137. Id. at 233.
138. Id. at 233-34 (citing 25 AM. JUR. 2D Election of Remedies § 14 (1996)).
139. See id. at 233 (citing 25 AM. JUR. 2D Election of Remedies § 14 (1996)).
140. Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 234. Exceptions include the pending claim being
dismissed for administrative convenience, filing a lawsuit that is not forbidden by
statute or regulation, and prejudice to the defendant that is more than minimal. 25
AM. JUR. 2D Election of Remedies § 14 (1996).
141. Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 234.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 234-35.
146. Id. at 235 (citing Speck v. Bowling, 892 S.W.2d 309 (Ky. 1995); Riley v.
Cumberland & Manchester R. R. Co., 29 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1930); Joseph Goldberger
Iron Co. v. Cincinnati Iron & Steel Co., 154 S.W. 374 (Ky. 1913).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 235-36.
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determination."' 149 The question becomes whether the defendant is
prejudiced to any significant extent to preclude allowing the
withdrawal and following judicial remedy.' This court did not
elaborate on what would be sufficient prejudice for a defendant.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision was the initial move
away from the first interpretations of Vaezkoroni. However, the
court was not given any guidelines from the Kentucky Supreme
Court as to which interpretation was correct when an appeal of this
case was taken, and the Supreme Court denied discretionary review
on June 5, 2002.151 This opinion by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
suggested that in the future, a court might take a step beyond the
scope of Wilson and possibly continue to narrow the holding in
Vaezkoroni, thereby implicitly overruling the decision.
C. The Final Move Away From Vaezkoroni
1. Brown v. Diversified Decorative Plastics, LLC. 152
With conflicting precedent in March 2003, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, clarified the election of remedies question
by deciding whether to overrule Wilson. 153  In a sharply divided
court, and over a strong dissent, the reasoning in Wilson was upheld,
and the language in Vaezkoroni was declared dicta.
154
After waiting for a determinative case, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals was Jpresented with Brown v. Diversified Decorative
Plastics, LLC. In Brown, two appellants over the age of forty were
fired from their jobs, and both filed age discrimination complaints
with the EEOC. 56  After receiving right to sue letters from the
EEOC, appellants filed similar claims with the Commission and
149. Id.
150. Id. at 235.
151. See id. at 229.
152. Brown v. Diversified Decorative Plastics, LLC., 103 S.W.3d 108 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2003).
153. See id. at 109.
154. Id. at 110-11. Judge Buckingham wrote the majority opinion. Judges
Barber, Combs, Johnson, Knopf, McAnaulty, Paisley, Schroder, and Tackett
concurred. Chief Judge Emberton wrote the dissent. Judges Baker, Dyche,
Guidugli, and Huddleston all joined. Id. at 109, 115.
155. Brown, 103 S.W.3d 108.
156. See id. at 109.
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separate civil suits in federal district court. 157 Upon consolidation of
the cases in federal court, appellants were granted a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice. 158 The pending complaints with the
Commission were withdrawn, and the appellants filed state court
cases. 
159
The trial court dismissed the case based upon Founder.160
Consequently, the Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion in Wilson
followed the trial court's decision, and appellants sought review.1 6 1
The court began the analysis in Brown by acknowledging the
similarities with Wilson and holding that Wilson should be
followed. 162 The court identified the precedent in Vaezkoroni but
found that Vaezkoroni could be factually distinguished in that the
administrative remedies were pursued to finality, whereas the same
was not true in the case subjudice.163
Interestingly, the court established the actual question decided in
Vaezkoroni was whether K.R.S. Section 344 applied to local human
rights commissions as well as the Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights. 164 The language following that determination in Vaezkoroni,
"[o]nce any avenue of relief is chosen the complainant must follow
that avenue through to its final conclusion," was considered dicta. 65
Therefore, the court of appeals was not bound by it as precedent.
166
The Kentucky Court of Appeals predicted the Kentucky Supreme
Court would not follow the language.167 The court then moved to a
detailed discussion of what constitutes dicta and applied such rules to
the Vaezkoroni facts. 68  Furthermore, the court addressed the
Founder decision and distinguished it based upon the fact that the
appellant's administrative claim in that case was still pending when
he filed for a judicial remedy in state court.169
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 109-10.
161. Id. at 110.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 110-11.
165. Id. at 111 (citing Vaezkornoi, 914 S.W.2d at 343).
166. Brown, 103 S.W.3d at 111.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 111-12.
169. Id. at 112.
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The court, as in Wilson, was left with the question of "whether
[appellant's] complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to the
doctrine of the election of remedies."'170  The court examined
different jurisdictional views on whether commencement of an action
constitutes an election of a remedy which precludes another action.
1 71
The court undertook a similar rationale as used in Wilson.
172
Reviewing the doctrine of election of remedies in prior Kentucky
cases outside of the employment discrimination scope, the court
concluded that filing a claim with an administrative body does not
preclude subsequent judicial remedies as long as the administrative
claim has not been pursued to finality.173 The court moved its
analysis to prior Kentucky cases involving election of remedies in the
employment discrimination context. 174 The court cited Canamore,
Clifton, and Grego, and summarized that they all added support to
Wilson's reasoning. 175 In short, the majority upheld Wilson v. Lowe's
Home Centers. 176
The dissent, written by Chief Judge Emberton, acknowledged that
Wilson provided an equitable result but stated that the majority's
interpretation of Vaezkoroni was erroneous.' 77 The dissent reviewed
the language in Vaezkoroni. 7 8 In disagreeing with the majority, the
dissent found that "the ultimate issue before the court was whether
Vaezkoroni was permitted to file his claim in the circuit court after
having filed with the local human rights commission."' 179 The dissent
suggested that the Vaezkoroni court's in-depth analysis on whether
local human rights commissions are in essence the same as the
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights under K.R.S. Section
344.270 may have misled the majority to conclude that that was the
only issue in the case. 18  The election of remedy issue was
dependent on the court resolving the commission question first.'
8
'
170. Id.
171. Id. at 112-13 (citing 25 AM. JUR. 2D Election of Remedies § 14 (1996)).
172. Brown, 103 S.W.3d at 113.
173. Id. at 112-14.
174. See id. at 114-15.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 115.
177. Id. (Emberton, C.J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 116.
180. See id. (Emberton, C.J., dissenting).
181. Brown, 103 S.W.3d at 116.
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Thus, the dissent said the court's final paragraph in Vaezkoroni was
not dicta. 182 Chief Judge Emberton conceded that Wilson was a well-
written opinion with an equitable result, but it ignored precedent that
the Kentucky Court of Appeals was obligated to follow. 183  In
conclusion, the dissent pleaded with the Kentucky Supreme Court to
grant discretionary review and provide an answer to the confusion. 184
Given the development in Vaezkoroni's line of cases, the Brown
decision is important for two main reasons. Brown was the first court
to closely examine the two issues presented in Vaezkoroni and to
conclude that the language in the final paragraph was dicta, instead of
placing the emphasis on factual distinctions. Previously, courts
examined factual differences between Vaezkoroni, in which the
claimant's administrative remedies had been pursued to finality
before filing for a judicial remedy, and other cases, where
administrative complaints had been filed, withdrawn, and then a
judicial remedy was sought. By holding en banc that the Vaezkoroni
language was dicta, the Kentucky Court of Appeals removed any
future analysis of the Vaezkoroni case because it sets no precedent.
No future factual distinctions should be necessary.
Second, Brown sets a clear standard for future appellate court
decisions. It can be stated with certainty that a plaintiff with an
employment discrimination claim in Kentucky can file for an
administrative remedy, withdraw that claim before a final order, and
seek a judicial remedy. This is the express view that will be followed
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, it is important to note
that the Kentucky Supreme Court still has not addressed the issue.
2. Wright v. Highland Cleaners, Inc. 185
The most current analysis of election of remedies was issued on
May 30, 2003 in Wright v. Highland Cleaners, Inc., 116 by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals. 187 This decision was on remand from
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Wright v. Highland Cleaners, Inc., No. 2000-CA-000949-MR, 2003 WL
21241505 (Ky. Ct. App. May 30, 2003).
186. Id.
187. See id.
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the Kentucky Supreme Court by an order dated June 5, 2002.188 The
Kentucky Supreme Court, in its first indication that it may no longer
support the Vaezkoroni opinion, vacated the earlier court of appeals
decision in the case sub judice and remanded it for "consideration in
light of Lowe's.''
89
Wright presented a familiar factual scenario. Loretta Wright, the
appellant, filed a discrimination claim with the Louisville & Jefferson
County Human Rights Commission and the EEOC.190 Appellant was
granted a dismissal order by the Commission,191 and, over a month
later, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter. 192 Then, the appellant
filed suit in state court. 193  The Jefferson County Circuit Court
granted summary judgment to the appellees based upon
Vaezkoroni.'94 The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed under the
Founder rationale. 195 Discretionary review was granted by the
Kentucky Supreme Court, and the above-mentioned order was
granted. 
96
In a new decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals started by
explaining that the holding in Wilson allowed an employee to
withdraw a complaint before the Commission prior to a final
determination, and then file a complaint in circuit court.19 7 The court
quoted a large portion of the Wilson opinion, explaining the factual
distinctions between Vaezkoroni and Founder. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Wright next applied the rules from Wilson to the
facts at hand. 199 The appellant did not have a claim that was pursued
to conclusion under her administrative remedies when she sought
judicial relief in state court.200 In addition, the court noted that the
appellees did not allege any prejudice from withdrawal of the
188. See Wright v. Highland Cleaners, Inc., No. 2001 -SC-0466-D (Ky. June 5,
2002) (remanding the case to the Kentucky Court of Appeals).
189. See Wright, 2003 WL 21241505, at *1.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. Id.; see also Wright, No. 2001-SC-0466-D.
197. Wright, 2003 WL 21241505, at *1.
198. Id. at *1-3.
199. Id. at *3.
200. Id.
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administrative claim in their motion for summary judgment. ° l
Therefore, the court reversed the circuit court's award of summary
judgment and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its
opinion. 20
2
The significance of Wright in the progeny of Vaezkoroni is great.
This case is important because it is on remand from the Kentucky
Supreme Court. This is the first time since the opinion in Vaezkoroni
was issued that the Kentucky Supreme Court remotely addressed the
doctrine of election of remedies in the employment discrimination
context. The supreme court's order mandating the court of appeals to
follow the reasoning in Wilson is an implicit adoption of Wilson as
the new standard for election of remedies in Kentucky. However, it
is necessary to note the timeline of the previously mentioned cases.
Wilson was decided in December 2001, and discretionary review
was denied on June 5, 2002204 - the same day that the Kentucky
Supreme Court issued the order in Wright to follow the Wilson
rationale. 20 5 Brown was decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
in March 2003,206 two months before the court issued a second
decision in Wright.20 7
The Court of Appeals in Wright expressly followed the order to
use Wilson's reasoning. A reference to the Brown decision that
upheld Wilson, but did so on a different analysis holding that the
language in Vaezkoroni was dicta, is clearly absent from the Wright
opinion. This begs the question - which rationale circumventing
Vaezkoroni would the Kentucky Supreme Court uphold since Brown
was decided after the order to remand Wright?
V. ELECTION OF REMEDIES AFTER VAEZKORONI
A. State of the Current Law Regarding Election of Remedies in
Kentucky Employment Discrimination Cases
As indicated by the overview, the interpretation of election of
201. See id.
202. Wright, 2003 WL 21241505, at *3.
203. See Wilson, 75 S.W.3d 229.
204. Id.
205. See Wright, No. 2001-SC-0466-D.
206. See Brown, 103 S.W.3d 108.
207. See Wright, 2003 WL 21241505, at *1.
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remedies in Kentucky employment discrimination law has undergone
drastic changes since the opinion in Vaezkoroni. Courts have moved
from a reliance on a claimant's initial choice regarding an avenue of
relief, administrative or judicial,2 °8 to a focus on concurrent pendency
of complaints as well as the pursuit to finality of a claim.209 It
appears that the new rule of law in Kentucky allows an employee to
file a claim with an agency or court, withdraw that claim before a
final hearing or order, and then re-file the claim under the alternate
avenue of relief.
210
Although this view is followed by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, the Kentucky Supreme Court has yet to issue an opinion
adopting the rule with a justified rationale. The only insight the
Supreme Court has given was an order remanding the Wright case to
the court of appeals to follow Wilson's reasoning. 211 Although this
might appear to be an express adoption of Wilson, questions still
remain because the Kentucky Court of Appeals subsequently
affirmed Wilson on different grounds in Brown. As Chief Justice
Emberton suggested in the Brown dissent, the Kentucky Supreme
Court desperately needs to issue an opinion clarifying the current law
on election of remedies in employment discrimination cases.21 2 Is
Vaezkoroni, along with Founder and Young, overturned? And if
these cases are overturned, what is the rationale? Do they serve as
mere dicta to courts or, in future cases, should an analysis be
employed? Their holdings have been substantially narrowed by
numerous courts.
B. Questions Following Vaezkoroni and Its Progeny
Not only do these questions remain regarding the current law, but
the new view of election of remedies in employment discrimination
cases presents a wide array of issues, addressed infra, that courts will
208. See Young v. Sabbatine, 142 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 1998); Founder,
23 S.W.3d 221.
209. See Grego, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92; Thomas, 2001 WL 1772018, at *1;
Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 230; Brown, 103 S.W.3d at 109; Wright, 2003 WL 21241505,
at *1.
210. See Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 235; Brown, 103 S.W.3d at 109; Wright, No.
2001-SC-0466-D.
211. See Wright, No. 2001-SC-0466-D.
212. See Brown, 103 S.W.3d at 116 (Emberton, C.J., dissenting).
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soon be deciding without proper precedent or guidance.
Does a claimant need an official withdrawal order from an
agency or court before pursuing a complaint from an alternative
avenue of relief? If a complaint is pending before the Commission,
then the claimant must request that his or her complaint be
withdrawn from the Commission. 213 Subsequently, the Commission
issues a withdrawal order stating that claimant's case is closed.21 4
The question then arises as to the time between the request for
withdrawal and the withdrawal order: may a claimant file for a
judicial remedy while awaiting a decision? The claimant is still
pursuing an administrative remedy until the Commission issues its
final order. Although a withdrawal request was filed by the claimant,
the administrative avenue of relief is pending as long as the
Commission is considering the request. The possibility remains that
the Commission could deny the order for withdrawal, therefore, the
Kentucky Supreme Court should not allow a claimant to pursue
judicial relief until a final order of withdrawal is granted by the
Commission because such action would violate the clear language of
K.R.S. Section 344.270 prohibiting simultaneous avenues of relief.215
The next question asks what constitutes finality in the
administrate avenue of relief? For example, a claimant may have
received an order denying his or her complaint from the Commission
and then file for reconsideration with the Commission. May the
complainant withdraw that request and follow with a judicial
remedy? A decision by the Commission or a local commission
constitutes a final decision of the record for a claimant.2 16 Thus, an
individual should be precluded from withdrawing an appeal and
seeking judicial relief because he or she had already obtained a final
administrative decision. The subsequent action of an appeal should
have no effect on election of remedies due to the untimeliness of the
action.
Another issue involves the timing of withdrawal from the
Commission. Once a claimant has initiated an administrative
proceeding, how long is he or she allowed to wait before
213. See generally KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.180 - 344.230; KY. REV.
STAT. ANN §§ 13A - 13B (listing administrative proceeding requirements).
214. Id.
215. See generally KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.180 - 344.230.
216. Id.
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withdrawing his or her claim? The Wilson court touched on this
question in its analysis holding: "[o]bviously, a party may not file a
claim, proceed to trial or hearing, and then withdraw the claim before
the ruling body issues a final determination. '' 217 However, the court
provided no further standard as to what would be an acceptable time
for withdrawal.218 An answer to this issue can be deciphered from a
determination of the following question regarding a defendant's
prejudice.
The final issue is likely to receive the most litigation. What
amounts to sufficient prejudice to a defendant to prevent the claimant
from withdrawing a complaint and re-filing under a different avenue?
The Wilson court held that the appellee was not prejudiced in that
instance since the administrative hearing was seven months later,
although Lowe's responded to a document and information request,
and filed and then amended its answer. 219 In addition, the Wright
court stated that "[appellee] does not allege that it suffered any
prejudice by Wright's withdrawal of her administrative claim," 220 so
the court was precluded from deciding the issue. With no current
standard on what constitutes prejudice to a defendant in employment
discrimination election of remedies cases, the Kentucky Supreme
Court should adopt a standard that considers subjecting a defendant
to the litigation process after participating in an administrative
remedy, including discovery and the expense of litigation, and a
party's detrimental reliance on the fact that the other party is pursuing
an administrative rather than judicial remedy. The moving party
must prove actual prejudice. A standard incorporating these factors
provides clarity to employees and protects employers.
These lingering uncertainties, along with an unclear precedent for
the new view on election of remedies in employment discrimination,
begs for a Kentucky Supreme Court decision clarifying the issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kentucky Supreme Court in Vaezkoroni upheld election of
remedies to preclude a claimant alleging employment discrimination
217. See Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 235-36.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Wright, 2003 WL 21241505, at *3.
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221from a judicial remedy after pursuing an administrative remedy.
In deciding the case, the court relied on the claimant's initial choice
of a remedy as the determinative factor. 222 The court's now infamous
language, "once any avenue of relief is chosen, the complainant must
follow that avenue through to its final conclusion," remains that by
which the case is remembered.223
In attempting to explain election of remedies in employment
discrimination, Vaezkoroni's impact had the opposite effect and only
created additional problems. Absent a clear rationale, Kentucky
courts were left to test the application of Vaezkoroni. The
Vaezkoroni decision gave rise to its progeny which included one
federal circuit case, 224 two federal district decisions, 225 and four
226Kentucky Court of Appeals opinions. These courts have
interpreted Vaezkoroni's inconsistently, using two separate
rationales. The majority of these courts has made factual distinctions
between Vaezkoroni and the cases at hand, to reconcile the conflict
227between Section 344.270 and allow the claimant a judicial remedy.
However, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in a sharply divided
opinion, recently held that the language in Vaezkoroni was dicta
which no longer served as precedent. 228 Under both interpretations,
courts have allowed claimants to file a complaint with the
Commission, then withdraw the complaint before it reaches finality,
and seek a judicial remedy in state court. 229 The emphasis has moved
from the initial choice of an avenue of relief to whether a claim is
currently pending and its pursuit to finality. It appears that
Vaezkoroni has been implicitly overruled. This leads to a new group
of questions. Is an official withdrawal letter needed from the
Commission? Is there a time limit in which the claimant must
withdraw the complaint before the Commission? Is there a standard
221. See Vaezkoroni, 914 S.W.2d at 343.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Young v. Sabbatine, 142 F.3d 438, 1998 WL 136559 (6th Cir.
Mar. 19, 1998).
225. See Grego, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 691; Thomas, 2001 WL 1772018, at *1.
226. See Founder, 23 S.W.3d at 221; Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 230; Brown, 103
S.W.3d at 109; Wright, 2003 WL 21241505, at *1.
227. See Grego, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 691; Thomas, 2001 WL 1772018 at *1;
Wilson, 75 S.W.3d at 230; Wright, 2003 WL 21241505 at *1.
228. See Brown, 103 S.W.3d at 109.
229. See supra text and accompanying notes 225-27.
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for withdrawing a complaint that would alilount to prejudice by the
defendant which could preclude a withdrawal?
The law's lack of clarity in this area is attributable to the
Kentucky Supreme Court's refusal to provide a new opinion with
respect to the matter. Vaezkoroni was decided in 1995,230 and, nine
years later, the court has yet to issue another decision. The
conflicting lower court opinions, as well as new questions, express
the need for a Kentucky Supreme Court decision clarifying past and
future problems.
In conclusion, even though Vaezkoroni is somewhat settled, it has
only led to a new array of questions regarding election of remedies in
Kentucky employment discrimination.
230. See Vaezkoroni, 914 S.W.2d at 341.

